H&R Block’s Refund Anticipation Loan: A Paradox of Profitability?

Submitted by John Paul on December 8, 2005 - 11:28.
Session Title:
Pre-conditions, Limitations & New Models
Date of talk or publication:
2005
Speaker Name / Title:
David Rose, Daniel Schneider & Peter Tufano
Organization:
H&R Block & Harvard Business School
Description:

Some firms comprehend the enormous potential that exists for providing services to the growing low-income segment. But operating in the low-income market has numerous complications. Concrete business impediments include designing efficient distribution and servicing systems, offering simple and “easy to consume” products, and training a sales force. Vendors of products that target the poor often must enter into contentious, long-standing, and irresolvable debates over appropriate levels of profit and consumer protection. Whatever the merits of these debates, firms can find themselves bedeviled by complicated interactions with non-customers including consumer advocates, the press, courts, and regulators. The experiences of H&R Block, a $4.2 billion income tax preparation and financial services firm headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, illustrate some of these costs. Block sells a highly profitable Refund Anticipation Loan (RAL) product to clients who opt to pay a fee to receive their tax refund in just one day. RAL consumers are typically from low-income households under considerable financial stress. Although RALs serve a specific need and are highly demanded (Block sold approximately five million in 2004), Block faces pressure from consumer advocates to lower the pricing of the product or to exit. This situation illustrates a number of hard questions with broad application. How much profit is “too much”? Who is the arbiter of such a decision? To the extent that consumer advocacy is costly, what are the implications for firm entry into and exit from the low-income market and for the prices of goods and services sold to the poor? What are the implications for consumers of advocacy activities that target large, visible, profitable firms? How should firms seeking to sell goods and services to the poor behave?


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